Libya: Now for the difficult stuff

Hugo Chavez might miss him, but most people have been pleased to hear that the Gaddafi family is on its way out in Libya.  While there's no doubt that Gaddafi was an erratic and violent tyrant, there are also plenty of reasons to be skeptical about the triumphalism of those who called for NATO intervention.  To put it simply: getting rid of Gaddafi was the easy part, and whatever happens next will be messier than the interventionists expect.

Once NATO intervened no one doubted that the regime's days were numbered.  Mercenaries just don't have much of a chance against coordinated air power.  But as we've seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military component of regime change is the easiest part; the aftermath is where policy making becomes uncertain.  This isn't to suggest that post-Gaddafi Libya is doomed to state failure, but commentators need to keep in mind that recent events are a beginning rather than an end.  Whether rebels are overthrowing a king or a Brotherly Guide the removal of the autocrat they united against leads to a splintering of political unity. 

This instability can be exacerbated by a lack of preexisting institutions, as is the case in Libya.  In the coming months the TNC will be required to come up with an entirely new constitution.  If they do so too quickly they will risk creating leaving out key groups, but if they do not act quickly enough then they allow a power vacuum to fester.  Either way creates opportunities for charismatic leaders, warlords, and radicals to derail the political process.  Add the widespread availability of advanced weapons and a provisional government already showing divisions and you have a recipe for political violence.

NATO has been uncharacteristically wise in rejecting committment to any open-ended presence in Libya.  Nonetheless, there is a continuing danger that sufficient instability would require robust military intervention.  Gaddafi's former arms stockpiles present a real terrorism threat.  If shoulder launched anti-aircraft missiles like the SA-7 become widely available on the international market they will undoubtedly end up in the hands of Jihadists, providing militants an unprecedented capacity for endangering commercial aircraft.  If prevailing instability resulted in Libya's becoming a terrorist staging ground it is difficult to see how a new occupation could be avoided.  Bad as Gaddafi was, this outcome would likely be worse for both the occupying coalition and the people of Libya.